Written not earlier than May 1908.
Published in part in 1933
in Lenin Miscellany XXV.
Published in full for the
first time.
Published according
to the original.
|
[23]... The idealists first convert thought into
an independent essence, independent of man (“subject for itself”), and then declare that in it, in this essence, the contradiction between being and thought is resolved; precisely because it, essence independent of matter, possesses a separate, independent being. And the contradiction is in fact resolved in it, for what is this essence after all? Thought. And this thought exists—is—in- dependently of anything else. But this solution of the contradiction is a purely formal solution. It is attained only because,—as we have already |
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stated above—one of its elements is eliminated:
that is, being independent of thought. Being proves |
NB | |
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to be a simple property of thought, and when we
say that a given object exists, it means only that it exists in thought.... |
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something exists,” Feuerbach remarks, “has no
other meaning than that something exists not in thought alone.”[1]
[28-29]...The materialist explanation of history
was primarily of methodological significance. Engels understood this per- |
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fectly when he wrote: “we need not so much bare
results as study (das Studium); results are nothing without the development leading up to them....”[2] |
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[29-30]...Generally speaking, one of the greatest
|
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services rendered by Marx and Engels to material-
ism is their elaboration of a correct meth- od. Concentrating on the struggle against the |
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speculative element in Hegelian philo-
sophy, Feuerbach did not appreciate its dialec- tical method and made little use of it. He says: “True dialectics is by no means a monologue of a solitary thinker with himself; it is a dialogue between I and You.”[3] But, first, in Hegel, too, dialectics does not signify “a monologue of a solitary thinker with himself”; secondly, Feuerbach’s re- mark correctly defines the starting-point of philosophy, but not its meth- od. This deficiency was made good by Marx and Engels, who understood that it would be wrong, in combating Hegel’s speculative philos- ophy, to ignore its dialectics.... |
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[31]...Many people confuse dialectics with the
theory of development, and it is in fact such a theory. But dialectics differs substantially from |
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the vulgar “theory” of evolution, which is wholly
constructed on the principle that neither nature nor history makes leaps, and that all changes in the world |
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take place only gradually. Hegel
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→ NB | |
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had already pointed out that the theory of develop-
ment understood in this way is ridiculous and untenable....
[33]...In general, the right to dialectical
|
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thought is confirmed by him[4] from the
dialectical properties of being. Here too being determines thought.... |
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[39]...Thus, the features of the geographical
environment determine the development of the productive forces; the development of the produc- tive forces in turn determines the development of economic relations and, then, all other social relations.... |
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[42]...Each given stage of development of the
productive forces has its corresponding definite type of weapons, military art, and, finally, of international—more exactly: inter-social, i.e., also, incidentally, inter- tribal—law. Hunting tribes cannot create large-scale political organisations precisely because the low level of their productive forces compels them, in the ancient Russian expression, to wander separately, in small social groups, in search of the means of subsistence....
[46-47]...According to Marx, the geographical
environment influences man through the production relations arising in the given locality on the basis of the given productive forces, the primary condition for the development of which is this environment’s features.... |
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[65-66]...The character of the “economic struc-
ture” and the direction in which it changes do not depend on man’s will, but on the state of the pro- ductive forces and on the changes that arise in production relations and become necessary to society due to the continued development of these forces. Engels explains this as follows: “Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan or even in a definite, delimited given society. Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, the complement and form of appearance of which |
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is accident.” Here human activity itself is
determined not as free, but as necessary, i.e., as in accordance with law, i.e., as being capable of becoming an object of scientific investi- |
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gation. Thus, historical materialism, while
not ceasing to point out that circumstances are changed by people, also gives us an opportunity for the first time of looking upon the process of this change from the standpoint of science. And that is why we are fully entitled to say that the material- |
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ist explanation of history provides the necessary
prolegomena for any theory of human society that desires to come forward as science....
[68].. .In primitive society which knew no divi-
sion into classes, man’s productive activity directly influences his outlook on the world and his aesthetic taste.... |
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[81-82]...If we were to state briefly the view
of Marx and Engels on the relation between the now famous “basis” and the no less famous |
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“superstructure,” the result would be
the following:
1) The state of the productive
forces;
2)The economic relations deter-
mined by it;
3) The socio - political system which
has grown up on the economic “basis” in question;
4) The psychology of social man
as determined in part directly by the economy and in part by the socio-political system which has grown up on it;
5) Different ideologies reflecting
the properties of this psychology....
[98]...Let us take as an example our agrarian
problem as it stands today. To the intelligent Constitutional Democratic landowner, “the compulsory alienation of land” may seem to be more or less, i.e., in inverse proportion to the amount of “fair compensation,” a sad historical necessity. But to the peasant, who is eager to come by “a bit of land,” it is only this “fair compensation” that will seem to be a more or less sad necessity, while “compulsory alienation” is bound to appear to him to be an expression of his |
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free will and the most valuable guarantee of his
freedom.
In saying this, we touch perhaps on the most
important point in the doctrine of freedom, a point not mentioned by Engels, of course, only because it is self-explanatory to one who has passed through the Hegelian school....
Feuerbach and Dietzgen. 24[5]
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[1] Werke. X, 187.—Lenin
[2] Nachlass, I, 477.—Lenin
[3] Werke, II, 345.—Lenin
[5] The reference is to page 24 of Plekhanov’s book (see p. 403 of this volume).—Ed.
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